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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the role and impact of labor-free resources such as foreign aid and natural 
resources revenues on the level of internet freedom in non-democracies. Specifically, with help 
of the Freedom on the net score, which captures a level of internet freedom among 65 countries 
worldwide, a new dataset was collected to investigate whether non-labor resources can better 
explain empirical observations among non-democratic countries. By extending the selectorate 
theory (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005) and other concepts, the paper argues that a 
nondemocratic country has more restrictive internet freedom as resources rents or received 
foreign aid are high. To test the proposed hypotheses both quantitative and qualitative methods 
were utilized. First, using panel data (2011-2016), the paper shows that labor-free revenues, 
namely foreign aid, might contribute to internet liberalization. However, the results are not 
statistically significant with the inclusion of various control variables such as GDP. Hence, with 
help of case studies, it was found out that not specifically labor-free resources but ongoing 
unrests provoke an incumbent to exercise a powerful impact on the Web. The findings of the 
paper barely can provide solid support of the presented theory and therefore layout that there is a 
need to collect data about non-democracies in terms of internet freedom and find a new way to 
measure the dependent variable. Nevertheless, a regime survival imperative in a context of 
authoritarian resilience is vital, where the latter impart urgency to restrict internet domain in 
times of socio-political instability. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Dictator’s Dilemma over the Internet Regulation 
 
Internet use profoundly affects governments and their societies. The former is attracted by many 
promises of the Web. The fall of the communism in the late of the last century cemented 
enthusiasm that information and communication technology (ICT) holds a technological promise 
to bring various changes, in particular, political ones. New information and communication 
technology, especially internet, is one of the contradictory areas in political science and 
international relations. Conventional wisdom holds that internet extensively can undermine 
authoritarian rule that turned into truism (Kalathil and Boas 2002). However, as it will be 
elaborated further such a statement can be empirically contested. 
 
From the perspective of a regime type, many democratic countries stick to the similar internet 
control policy by protecting and promoting internet freedom, whereas non-democratic regimes 
mostly impose a restrictive internet regulation policy. For autocrats the internet itself is a Janus-
faced phenomenon: on the one hand, it is a vital development resource, on the other hand under 
certain circumstances it poses challenges to an incumbent’s political survival. For example, 
domestic dissidents might overcome a problem of collective actions by means of social media 
(Diamond 2010). Such challenges can be resolved by many means and even serve state-shaped 
interests (Kalathil and Boas 2002; Rod and Weidmann 2015). 
 
Many countries regulate the internet and fight against its destructive elements. For instance, 
Germany and Singapore were two of the first countries to impose restrictions on the spread of 
hatred speech, pornography or other forms of discrimination (Joshi 1996; L. Andrews 1997). 
One can assume that on surface democracies mostly worry about societal issues in this regard, 
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whereas non-democracies are anxious about political repercussions of online communication 
fostered by internet.  
 
From this perspective, non-democratic regimes face a problem of disentangling “optimistic” and 
“pessimistic” views of the internet (Taubman 1998). Democratic leaders tend to be more open in 
the realm of the internet, while leaders of autocracies face the so-called “dictator’s dilemma”, a 
dilemma when a leader wishes to benefit from the internet (e.g. economically) without risking 
regime stability. Specifically, on the one hand, implementation and active development of ICT 
can positively reconstruct an economy, on the other hand, the internet can be a powerful tool for 
opposition to set a population against regime elite and organize mass demonstrations. Thus, an 
incumbent should know benefits and drawbacks of an internet policy he plans to implement.  
 
Taking into account that a political leader aims to stay in power as long as possible, the question 
of this paper is why do some non-democracies allow more liberalized internet regulation, 
whereas in other non-democratic states the internet is heavily regulated? The global spread of the 
internet evoked a list of empirical puzzles for scholars. While given the fact that all countries 
regulate the internet, I would like to shed light on the question of what factors explain the 
variation of the non-democratic way of the internet regulation. For instance, what can explain the 
variation of internet restriction of Uganda as a partially free country and Ethiopia as a not free 
state?  This paper contributes to the literature on internet regulation by examining the impact of 
resources revenues and foreign aid allocations and their relation to internet regulation policy and 
authoritarian resilience. 
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The thesis proceeds as follows. After the introduction, chapter 2 examines the internet regulation 
related literature. Next, I present the theoretical framework of my thesis and derive two testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 introduces statistical analysis by testing the derived hypotheses, which is 
followed by chapter 4 that articulates case-study analysis of three countries. Finally, in chapter 5 
I make final conclusions and discuss further research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theory: Resources Rents and Foreign Aid 
 
2.1 Literature Review  
 
Much is written about political as well as economic rationales behind (e.g. maintain political 
stability or attract foreign investments), but less literature in this context is devoted to what else 
might drive political leaders in non-democracies to change internet policies. Few have 
systematically examined whether foreign aid or resources’ revenues affect a rate of internet 
freedom. By identifying conditions under which a political elite feel free either to set limits on 
internet policy or provide more liberty, is the missing gap the paper seeks to fill. 
 
The Internet itself is a decentralized network and only some of its infrastructural parts are under 
control and regulation. Though the internet is truly a global phenomenon, the domestic context is 
of importance. The domestic political system plays a crucial role in terms of internet control, not 
least because domestic actors (i.e. regime and/or political elite) in both democracies and 
autocracies generally deal with internet regulation differently. In nondemocratic countries unlike 
in democracies political leaders have “the keys” to the internet governance. With the dominant 
role of state playing in almost all aspects of political, socio-economic spheres, in particular, in 
internet aspect, a state extensively operates in interests of itself and/or political leader. 
 
2.1.1 Regime Type and Internet Freedom 
Before identifying the relationship between regime type and internet freedom, I should specify 
boundaries of various types of political regimes. According to Magaloni et al. (2013), if a 
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country fails to meet at least one of the following criteria, it is defined as a non-democracy: (1) a 
civilian government is the main source of policy making; (2) political leaders come from various 
and competitive parties; (3) checks and balances system; (4) free and fair political elections. 
Such regimes might be a monarchy, a military, a single party or a multi-party, which have 
various political institutions, political establishment and governance control. Thus, internet 
regulation might also differ from that regime perspective. However, such a distinction is not 
applied in this paper as the sample of non-democracies used in the statistical part is little in size. 
One way or another the internet exists in an environment of regulation. However, such regulation 
can be different in its magnitude, applicability, and by initiators who impose a regulation (Reid 
Hunt 2014). Usually, scholars define three types of internet regulation: self-regulation, co-
regulation, and command-and-control (Cave, Marsden, and Simmons 2008; Reid Hunt 2014). 
The most preferred type of regulation is self-regulation when regulation power and rules’ 
implementation are concentrated in hands of private actors, although a state might punish them 
in a case of non-compliance by laws. Co-regulation includes an interaction of both, private and 
public actors; however, internet policy building is initiated and supervised by a state. In the third 
one, a government authority is in charge of everything in terms of internet regulation process. 
While most of the democratic states were occupied with the concept of internet self-regulation 
with minimum government control, autocracies take upon themselves the “strategy of 
containment” (Taubman 1998) or command-and-control type with significant government 
interference in the process.  
 
Since the web was introduced, its regulation development made the way from the open internet 
to internet with contested access, which is operated to the present time. The four phases of 
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internet regulation (i.e. “open access, access denied, access controlled and access contested”) 
depict, how the internet control substantially changed since the beginning of its advent (Palfrey 
2010).  While Palfrey (2010) provided information from the perspective of internet regulator, 
Eko (2001) presents a more specific typology and the web functions in terms of country-specific 
characterizations (e.g. culture). The typology includes Multilateralist or International model, 
Neo-Mercantilist or E-Commerce model, Gateway model, Developmentalist model. All these 
models can be found in a mixed version either in democracy or non-democracy; however, in the 
latter the most frequent one is the Gateway model, when a government fulfills broad functions of 
the internet provider and its regulator. 
 
The question arises is not whether or not to regulate the Web, but how to carry the regulation in 
the most effective way depending on an incumbent’s political survival. Providing an answer to 
the question, Weckert (2000) considers both moral and technical aspects. Content restriction can 
be morally justified in case it captures pornography, hate speech and so on, which is applied to 
all sorts of countries despite their regime type. Lessig (1999) defines internet regulation, or 
“regulability”, as “the ability of the government to regulate the behavior of (at least) its citizens 
while on the Net”. Furthermore, internet control or regulation can be understood through the 
prism of access to the internet, its functionality (e.g. speed and bandwidth) and internet activity 
control. For both democracies and autocracies, internet watchdogs such as national intelligence 
institutions are crucial in terms of internet governance, however for various reasons (Eriksson et 
al. 2009). Whereas democracies arguably fight terrorism online, for instance, non-democracies in 
addition to it can fight their own citizens who might discredit the authority of a ruler. For 
example, the ruling elite of Singapore with help of a legislation tool, namely a web-site licensing 
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process, ensured that opposition cannot use internet as a medium for political communication 
(Kalathil and Boas 2002). 
 
For democratic countries, internet openness means more political engagement, low cost of 
acquiring information and inclusion of marginalized groups in a political life (Tkacheva 2013). 
Within participatory politics, the internet itself became a tool to broaden electorate, when 
political parties and other politics-engaged groups by using marketing techniques strengthen 
their campaign with help of operations like controlled communication, mobilization and fund-
raising during electoral campaigns (Chadwick and Howard 2010).  
 
Meanwhile, for non-democracies, internet freedom works with a formula that it limits the ability 
of a political leader to perpetuate uncontested power. Hence, by better understanding political 
effects of the internet a leader leads a policy that positively favors his regime survival. Collective 
characteristics of the web, one of which is a free flow of information, including “democratic” 
one (e.g. opposite one), increases the probability of a leader who abuses power to be ousted. 
Contrary to Milner (2006) and Groshek (2009), Morozov (2012) argues, if properly used, the 
internet as a repressive technology in hands of autocrats might ensure durability and longevity of 
an incumbent. To sum up, the internet in an authoritarian environment mostly tends to amplify a 
regime’s brutality, whereas democratic political system mostly increases political and civil 
liberties of a population (Best and Wade 2007).  
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2.1.2 Non-democratic Regimes and the Internet 
 
Different authoritarian regimes have a different level of tolerance for free speech. This should be 
clearly reflected in their internet policies, as the internet itself enhances access to information, 
including the so-called ‘democratic’ one, or information that can somehow undermine dictators’ 
political survival. In non-democracies authorities mandate various repressive tools for one simple 
reason: to ensure political stability.  
 
In the field of internet, the central dilemma any dictator (except North Korea) faces is to build a 
proper mechanism to maintain an iron grip on citizens and simultaneously ensure the growth of a 
country in terms of adoption of information and communication technologies. Taking into 
account the so-called ‘control versus growth’ or dictator’s dilemma those in power design rules 
to their advantage by ensuring notables with joint spoils and crucially not allowing any rebels to 
escalate. All rulers face threats either from masses or his allies (i.e. with whom he shares 
domestic power). To guarantee a political survival a non-democratic ruler deals with the so-
called ‘problems of authoritarian rule’. Namely, it includes a problem of not allowing masses to 
revolt (“problem of authoritarian control”) and a problem of making concessions to power elites 
(“problem of authoritarian power-sharing”) (Svolik 2012). The literature concerns both issues 
(Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005; Reuter and Gandhi 2011), however research of authoritarian 
ruler problems from the perspective of internet freedom is more sparse. 
 
The internet, by definition, provides one of the most effective means of communication, 
learning, business dealing, tools for democracy and human rights advocacy. While one group of 
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countries might reap the benefits of it, another group barely can capitalize on the internet’s 
positive effects. Only by contrasting the given lifestyle to the better one, dissatisfied actors might 
breach an incumbent’s control monopoly (Urry 1973), but by regulating internet content and 
other internet capabilities a leader can effectively maintain stability in his favor (Taubman 1998). 
In fact, the growth of the internet as a source of information, communication etc. generated a 
debate over its impact on non-democratic countries leaders’ political survival. Access to 
information and wide communication systems reshaped conventional rules and ruined old 
definitions. For example, some technological advancements like social media revolutionized the 
ability to communicate and undertake relatively rapid collective actions to rebel against 
incumbents (Diamond 2010; Kalathil and Boas 2002; Rod and Weidmann 2015).  
 
Non-autocratic leaders’ fear of internet expansion and its consequences is justified. Dictators 
perceive oppositional internet as a threat to its survival, as digital technologies such as social 
media platforms demonstrated its mobilization potential, for example, during the Arab Spring 
(Stier 2017). Howard et al. (2011) found that in a time of the Arab Spring Twitter and/or 
Facebook were utilized not only to communicate between participants of uprisings, but such 
online conversations were preceding to ‘on ground’ protests. Nevertheless, some isolated cases 
should not make scholars to overestimate a role of internet’s revolution facilitation. Even though 
social media played a particular role in series of uprisings in the Middle East North Africa 
(MENA) region, Khondker (2011) warns that online communication technologies might play 
only ‘supportive role’ or as Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) name it ‘instrumental role’ to make 
revolutions successful. As specified by Bellin (2012), there are four factors, which determine 
rebels to revolt: long-term discontent, an emotional component, impunity for participation as a 
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rebel, access to social media (i.e. the internet). Taking an example of Burma, one might observe 
a situation of how activists of the Free Burma campaign used internet platform for mass 
mobilization of transnational activism, however not sufficient for palpable political changes in 
the country (Kalathil and Boas 2002). Next, a potential participant is concerned with one’s 
participation costs coming from uncertainties of revolution and status quo payoffs (Shadmehr 
and Bernhardt 2011). However, such participation costs for insurgents are reduced when there is 
a total participation meaning that a rebel should be confident that a protest is supported en masse 
(Bueno De Mesquita 2010). By and large, new media indirectly and under certain conditions 
indeed poses serious threats to an incumbent, however evasive. 
 
In order to draw any threats away from a dictator’s political survival, a leader focuses on power 
extension from the standpoint of internet control and regulation (Gunitsky 2015; Kalathil and 
Boas 2002; Morozov 2012). Paradoxically, to reinforce authoritarian rule it is in the interest of a 
leader to provide internet access to citizens for several reasons. Gunitsky (2015) provides the 
most сomprehensible mechanism of internet control by an authoritarian leader: (1) counter-
mobilization; (2) discourse framing; (3) preference divulgence; (4) elite coordination. The author 
stresses that autocrats started to move towards a strategy called ‘positive control’ of the internet. 
Positive control sidesteps from strategies of censoring and blocking to using information in favor 
of the regime bolstering. Selective internet control is an approach most autocratic countries 
exercise. As exemplified in the Chinese censorship program, King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) 
argue that public expressions in social media and other platforms encourage the government to 
know preferences of citizens and if necessary to mollify masses. Last but not least is that with the 
help of social media a leader in an autocratic regime can ensure accountability of local elites. 
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Discontent and informational asymmetry at a local level that might undermine the legitimacy of 
an incumbent who can not be in touch with local circumstances might be solved and excluded by 
online monitoring of local elites. Depending on how effective authoritarian leaders restrict or 
provide access to the internet, it can be perceived either “liberation” or “repressive” technology 
(Rod and Weidmann 2015). 
 
It is fair to say that the internet itself ushered in a new way of economic development and 
prosperity for many countries (Castells 2009; George 2003; Taubman 1998). Internet policy in 
such countries as Malaysia and Singapore was initially framed in economic terms. For example, 
Malaysia introduced the so-called Bill of Guarantees (BoGs), which has a point of no censorship 
of the internet for attracting advanced technology companies. Economic benefits may force 
leaders to adopt some changes like the implementation of e-government programs and provide 
conditions to attract potential investors and tourists without any danger to a leader’s political 
survival, which might even increase support of citizens (Kalathil 2003). However, it should be 
also pointed that sometimes a country’s attractiveness from the perspective of investment 
revenues defies the extent to which potential investors are ready to override political or any other 
disagreements with a government (Kalathil and Boas 2002). A good example is China with its 
1.3 billion potential customers. 
 
While the internet can pose some challenges to incumbent’s office, it still remains an attractive 
technology for rulers, and no dictator chooses to ignore its diffusion completely. By 
manipulating the control mechanisms of the internet, an autocracy can promote benefits to a 
regime and restrict domains of potential risks (Boas 2000), the latter include the dissemination of 
  
12 
oppositional ideas, a rise of insurgents who can actively use coordination and mobilization tools 
of the Web platform (Kalathil and Boas 2002; Morozov 2012). The benefits, on the other hand, 
are notable too. Economic prosperity in terms of e-commerce sector development, attraction of 
foreign investments, helping to market domestic products abroad and much more (Clarke 2005; 
Kalathil and Boas 2002; Reid Hunt 2014). For example, such e-commerce companies like the 
Chinese Alibaba make billions of dollars as profit and Communistic China with progressive tax 
rate has a sizable contribution to its state treasury (Alibaba n.d.). In addition, those governments 
that seek to disrupt telecommunication connections, even temporary ones, can experience a 
negative financial impact. For example, as it was estimated by the OECD, the decision to shut 
down the internet for five days during the Arab Spring uprisings cost Egypt 90 million dollars 
(Reynolds and Mickoleit 2011).  
 
To some extent, control of the internet is control of the revolutionary process. Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2010) assert that in order to exclude a possibility to be deposed through 
revolutions or coups a leader can either increase public goods and appease a revolutionary mob 
or cut them by suppressing coordination goods (e.g. freedom of assembly, free press).1 Leaders, 
who get foreign aid and rents from natural resources, suppress coordination goods and 
simultaneously still buy off the loyalty of his coalition, thus ensure their political survival 
(Mesquita and Smith 2009). 
 
In terms of internet freedom, the Web platform as a coordination good can be suppressed if a 
nondemocratic leader is provided by resources coming from donors and/or resources rents. Much 
                                                     
1 In this paper I consider internet freedom as a public good and/or coordination good. 
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scholarly literature investigated issues of internet freedom and democracy, internet diffusion and 
its regulation, but a few works engage in examining what factors impact internet regulation from 
the perspective of private and public goods provision. For instance, Mcglinchey and Johnson 
(2007) argue that internet regulation is dependent on who provides finances for its adoption: 
either internal or external actors. On the example of Central Asian countries, the authors come to 
the conclusion that in case if a state economically relies largely on natural resources rents, it has 
restrictive internet policy. The opposite is true for a case, when a state under conditionality 
receives foreign aid donations and donors “force” a regime to implement more liberal internet 
regulation. Here, by focusing only on one region the article lacks more evidence for any bold 
conclusions. Thus, in my paper, I am planning to examine, how foreign aid, as well as oil 
abundance, impact the likelihood of internet freedom restriction among non-democratic 
countries. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In this section I provide a discussion of my theoretical arguments based on the selectorate theory 
of Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2005) and the concept of ‘audience costs’ (Weeks 2008). The 
theoretical framework of the thesis explores the relationship between government resources (i.e. 
resources rents and foreign aid) and internet freedom incorporating the logic of internet use 
among non-democratic countries.2 First, I present the main principles of the selectorate theory. 
Next, I examine how implications of the latter can explain decisions of authoritarian rulers to 
censor or not censor the internet by presenting a simple theoretical model. In doing so, I would 
like to form a broader theory explaining how internet policies are created and whether such 
                                                     
2 Note that terms non-democratic, authoritarian, autocratic, dictatorial are used interchangeably.  
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labor-free revenues as resources rents and aid support impact a leader’s decision while taking 
into account the extent of reliance on energy sector or official development assistance. 
 
First, according to the selectorate theory, I assume that polities consist of leaders and 
challengers, coalition members (or winning coalition), selectorate, and disenfranchised (Bueno 
de Mesquita, et al. 2005). It is argued that while holding power, leaders have a goal to maximize 
their chances of staying in office (i.e. political survival). Challenger can remove an incumbent 
leader and take his place. An incumbent, in order to hold power, should keep loyal a sufficient 
number of coalition members. The pool of citizens who have a say in selecting a leader is the 
selectorate. The subgroup of the latter is the winning coalition (or simply coalition), who 
maintain a leader in power. For instance, for a case of monarchy, a leader (i.e. monarch) might 
need a support from a majority of the aristocracy (i.e. coalition members) to stay in power.  
 
Second, the selectorate and the winning coalition, according to authors, are two groups or factors 
that govern incumbent’s policy decisions (i.e. spending decisions, institutionalization, taxing 
etc.). Leaders provide public and private goods. Whereas from public goods (e.g. civil liberties, 
peace etc.) benefit all citizens, the private ones (e.g. legal impunity) are distributed only among 
members of the winning coalition. As the size of the coalition increases, provision of private 
benefits decreases, then a leader is expected to expand allocation of public goods. Thus, how 
much revenue to be spent on “buying” support of the selectorate or the coalition depends on their 
sizes and availability of revenues.  
The incumbent can derive revenues from taxation and/or natural resources rents. From an 
incumbent’s perspective, taxation is one of the most important functions a society fulfils. 
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However, in terms of budget constraints, foreign aid is also considered.3 In case there is a small 
winning coalition, which is usually a case of nondemocracies, a leader focuses on allocating 
private goods mostly. For the opposite scenario, when the coalition is relatively large, 
incumbents’ effort is shifted to public goods’ provision.  
Furthermore, Weeks (2008) claims that apart from dealing with international counterparts a non-
democratic leader also has to consider potential costs of backing down domestically. As this 
thesis is mostly centered on domestic politics, the audience in autocracies, which is proxied by 
the domestic elite or in the selectorate theory parlance by winning coalition, might have 
incentives to punish an incumbent leader. Both Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2005) and Weeks 
(2008) agree that for ensuring political survival authoritarian leaders should gain the support of 
the winning coalition or domestic group. However, if a dictator has an ability to monitor and 
coerce his backers for the sake of his own livelihood, he can control his elites’ actions. Thus, for 
present leaders, it is vital to exert control via internet capacities and simultaneously to buy a 
continuation of his power by allocating scarce resources to hold the winning coalition’s loyalty.  
As a democracy level falls, an autocrat needs more control over the domestic group, his winning 
coalition. Figure 1 clearly illustrates an incentive of an incumbent with help of the Web to limit 
the internet freedom and exclude any possibility to destabilize political situation. Yet there is 
variation of internet freedom even among non-democratic states. Such countries as Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan have ‘partially free’ internet and there are some regimes like the United Arab 
Emirates and Uzbekistan with ‘not free’ internet domain. Nevertheless, there is a negative 
monotonic correlation. By and large, the lower the democracy index - the clearer is the 
                                                     
3 From the point of “buying off” argument resources rents are equivalent to aid or any other forms of government’s 
income (Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009). 
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repression of online sphere in a country. For example, Saudi Arabia, an autocratic kingdom that 
promote internet as an economic development tool rigorously try to silence any critical voices 
online dragged under antiterrorism and cybercrimes laws (Saudi Arabia n.d.).  
 
Figure 1 Democracy and Internet Restriction (Both Averaged for 2011-2016)4 
 
Source: Freedom House and Polity IV Project data 
 
The idea that democratic countries are less likely to violate human rights sounds reasonably and 
can be supported by a number of empirical evidence. On the contrary, the nature of non-
                                                     
4 Democracy is the Polity IV’s variable Polity2 ranging from −10(perfect autocracy) to 10 (perfect democracy). 
internet freedom score is Freedom House’s ‘Freedom on the net’ score. Freedom House classifies internet freedom 
into free (0-30), partially free (31-60), and not free (61-100). 
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democracy suggests that citizens can barely exercise their political rights, for instance, to vote in 
electing a political leader. Two scenarios can take place in such a case: (1) rigged elections or 
formal reelection of an incumbent; (2) revolution or removal a leader from power. In case a 
rigged election is a success for an incumbent, citizens still can decide, whether to revolt or not 
(Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009). Positions taken by autocracies in the realm of internet control 
suggest that leaders of those countries face a vital choice: expand the internet freedom, leaving it 
free from hefty government control, or restrict its diffusion, taking total control of the Web. Note 
that by expanding the internet freedom a political ruler might increase his chances to be deposed 
by an “online revolution”. In such cases, authoritarian leaders face the so-called “dictator’s 
dilemma” (Best and Wade 2007; Boas 2000; Kedzie 1997) and here internet policy is a part of a 
state’s bureaucracy’s incentive scheme. Starting out from the dictator’s dilemma I will elaborate 
leaders’ decision either to decrease or increase the internet freedom, indicating trade-offs an 
incumbent comes across for an each given scenario.  
 
In evaluating the process of internet regulation in non-democracies, it is helpful to consider why 
countries sometimes block communication and technology changes. The potential for 
destabilization of the existing system followed by such technological changes understandably 
might haunt leaders, which in result can erode their political advantage (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006). From another angle, such technological welcome can increase economic prosperity (e.g. 
lure foreign investment into a country) and revenues for private/public distribution as well as 
revenues for their discretionary use. Non-democratic rulers show their interest in obtaining 
benefits of new technologies (e.g. Burma and Cuba promote tourism online) and simultaneously 
to make the internet remain political reliable when necessary (Kalathil and Boas 2002).  
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Some countries like China or Saudi Arabia introduced deliberative tactics, or as He and Warren 
(2011) call it “authoritarian deliberation”, for the internet access, rewarding from its 
implementation and maintaining the strict regime’s support simultaneously. In these cases, more 
nuanced methods of the internet regulation are applied. Within the Chinese regulation policy, 
public expressions are not restricted by the government, which allows them to know preferences 
of masses and somehow mollify them. Such internet-related companies like Google, Facebook, 
Wordpress etc. were blocked on mainland China, substituted by local products and as a result, 
simplified a process of controlling information environment by the regime. If the potential for 
collective actions' formation is high, censorship takes place (Zheng 2005). Thus, for some 
countries like China, internet regulation policy is not aimed at criticism exclusion per se, but to 
decrease the likelihood of mass mobilization (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Such tactics might 
also indicate how leaders can deliberatively monitor people and members of the winning 
coalition. As a leader in autocracies has an impact on the internet development, given the 
political, economic, social and other conditions he builds infrastructure that favors the regime 
stability. Public and private goods serve narrow interests of a political leader. Hence, in this 
paper I assume that authoritarian leaders possess control over policies and internet policy is no 
exception.  
 
As Figure 2 shows, non-democracies vary greatly in terms of internet regulation. An incumbent 
ruler chooses a policy drawing attention to his contracts with elites and citizens (and sizes of 
both). When resources mostly come from citizens (i.e. taxation), a dictator compares expected 
payoffs of free and not free internet. If a dictator relies on taxation mainly (here we assume that 
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an optimal tax rate is chosen), then in order to take taxes in future a leader needs to provide some 
public goods. Even the worst dictator should provide some basic needs to people like education 
and health care. Moreover, recently one more public good – internet – has appeared. Hence, to 
balance between policies that benefit masses and satisfy a leader, the latter should acknowledge 
at what level the internet freedom can abandon those who might organize revolution to start their 
anti-governmental campaign.  
 
State authority still can censor some online information (be it hate speech, pornography, or 
politically unstable resources), but there can be less detention of online activists, for instance. In 
such a scenario, in order to get rich from a population (through taxation) a leader provides more 
liberalized internet. The opposite is true for non-labor resources such as oil and natural gas rents, 
as well as donor allocations. In such a case a leader of oil-rich, diamond-studded or on 
development assistance dependent regime can limit the budget canals to resources revenues and 
foreign aid. In this case, leaders attempt to ensure political stability by violating users’ online 
rights and blocking of politically dangerous online platforms and web-sites. When there is no 
need to largely appease citizens (as most of resources for private goods come not from taxation) 
it is easier to stay autonomous from the inside and provide benefits only to a small number of 
people who help an incumbent to stay in power. 
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Figure 2 Non-Democracies and Internet Restriction (Both Averaged for 2011-2016)5 
 
Source: Freedom House and Polity IV Project data 
 
At the same time, one could argue why can’t a leader while benefiting from resource revenues 
placate opposition by providing some appearance of internet freedom or sharing some rents. This 
could be a circumspect decision in terms of providing political stability and wriggling out threats 
coming from opposition. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) claim that if resources rents are high 
there is no need to cooperate with opposition. On the other hand, it can be a case that some 
rentier states privatized energy sector not only as a part of proper economic decision, but to 
acquire discretionary revenues to counter opposition in future  (Luong and Weinthal 2001). 
                                                     
5  Democracy is the Polity IV’s variable Polity2 ranging from −10 (perfect autocracy) to 10 (perfect democracy). 
internet freedom score is Freedom House’s ‘Freedom on the net’ score. Freedom House classifies internet freedom 
into free (0-30), partially free (31-60), and not free (61-100). 
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Wantchekon (2002) assumes that an incumbent by investing a part of his wealth rents in crucial 
projects (e.g. infrastructure projects in target areas) can lessen a probability of political unrest 
driven by opposition. For the theoretical model of this paper I emphasize that for a dictator 
especially in a rentier state it is more reasonable to use rents for a discretionary mechanism and 
not to provide more internet freedom. As there is an incumbency advantage – be it informational, 
budgetary and/or over a challenger (i.e. opposition) a part of rents coming from resources 
revenues/aid can be distributed to voters (i.e. for electoral gain) and affect their decision during 
elections in favor of an incumbent. 
 
Regarding official developmental assistance, aid literature identifies several reasons that explain 
patterns of aid giving. It is assumed that aid giving is associated with political considerations, 
which include colonial past, alliances ties and strategic interests (Alesina and Dollar 2000). The 
authors state that on the example of France the former colonies receive aid support in disregard 
to political and economic regimes. Change-seeking policy is another explanation of providing 
developmental assistance. Here, from the perspective of foreign policy Palmer, Wohlander, and 
Morgan (2002) attempt to explicate that a donor country’s aid policy is a foreign policy tool that 
aims to change or maintain a recipient country’s behavior. In particular, it was found out that the 
amount of aid support is negatively correlated with a recipient’s level to initiate a dispute. 
Furthermore, foreign aid can be an instrument for policy concessions, as described by Mesquita 
and Smith (2009), to promote interests in international organizations such as the United Nations 
bodies (Kuziemko and Werker 2006), to resolve a humanitarian crisis (i.e. natural disaster or 
poverty) (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005) and many others. Not excluding the possibility of policy 
concessions, however in this paper I ignore donors’ incentives because in terms of the Master 
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thesis and given the data available it is hard to identify incentives of donor states when allocating 
official finance flows for each specific country.  
 
We should notice that leaders pursue a goal to remain in power once they gained it. Survival is a 
primary goal when leaders choose and implement those policies, which might affect their tenure 
and mitigate risks to be ousted. From the theoretical perspective, public policy varies as the 
coalition size either increases or decreases (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005). By extending the 
selectorate theory Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) I would like to assess how survival 
threats like revolutions, presence of resources rents and/or aid allocations interact and affect 
leaders’ internet policy choices.  
 
As selectorate theory states, a country with a small winning coalition, which is typically a non-
democracy, is more vulnerable to revolutions for several reasons. A large number of outsiders, 
who wants to take the power, few rewards to the latter and long lasting tenure of incumbent – it 
all provide conditions for a revolution. In order to eliminate such a threat, an incumbent with 
help of oppression and various suppression tools obstruct efforts of revolutionaries to recruit and 
organize.  According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), leaders of small winning coalition 
with access to the so-called labor-free resources (i.e. oil and foreign aid) are more likely to 
suppress public goods in order to decrease the probability of revolts’ success. In a broad sense, 
public goods include the presence of freedom of speech, free press, communication ease, and 
transparency. Thus, in this paper internet as an essential part of modern society is included in 
public goods. 
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Risk for an authoritarian incumbent arises every time he either lack resources for private 
allocations or misallocates them (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005). When an autocracy is not rich 
in resources other than taxation, an incumbent has to rely on the revenues received from his 
citizens. In common, authoritarian rulers have more incentives to enhance public goods with the 
objective to quiet a close to revolution mob.  If an autocracy is not either an oil-abundant country 
or receive a large amount of foreign aid, it is assumed that a leader might actively release internet 
restriction from the heavy governmental control in order to benefit from it (e.g. politically and 
economically) and increase a potential for governmental revenues flowing from citizens. 
Figure 1 Labor Resources and Public Goods 
 
Labor resources            more provision of public goods             less restrictive internet regulation             
(i.e. taxation)  
 
Hypothesis 1: A non-democratic country has less restrictive internet regulation when resources 
rents/aid are low. 
 
On the other hand, leaders who get foreign aid and likewise other contributors of resource-curse 
ensure their leadership survival and keep following unpopular policies among citizens (de 
Mesquita and Smith 2009). Thus, abundance of resources revenues and aid support contribute to 
a political leader’s decision to pull internet under the heavy governmental control. It is 
reasonable for a leader of autocratic state to contract or to limit the provision of goods for public 
use, specifically internet, as its expansion poses challenges to political survival. Autocrats need 
money to distribute them to members of the winning coalition. From that standpoint aid, for 
example, can be perceived as a force of evil that promote misbehavior of an incumbent. Such 
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contractionary response (i.e. lessen provision of public goods or more restrictive internet policy) 
decreases the ability to revolt, but at the same time it lessens economic productivity and put a 
country under increased international pressure. Nevertheless, leaders might satisfy the members 
of a coalition with private goods not through taxation, but through other non-labor canals that is 
a convenient alternative.6 Here, I argue that autocrats who receive resources from oil/gas 
revenues and foreign aid forsake public policy goals to hold on power by rewarding his 
supporters and imposing more restrictive internet regulation. 
 
Figure 2 Labor-free Resources and Public Goods 
 
 
Labor-free7 resources        less provision of public goods        more restrictive internet regulation             
(i.e. resources rents and foreign aid)  
 
Hypothesis 2a: A non-democratic country has more restrictive internet regulation as resources’ 
rents are high. 
Hypothesis 2b: A non-democratic country has more restrictive internet regulation as foreign aid 
allocations are high. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
6 The theory in this paper does not consider conditionality of foreign aid (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Stokke 2013), 
however the author realizes the importance of it as part of the further theory development. 
7 In this paper such terms as labor and labor-free resources as well as taxation and rents/aid respectively are used 
interchangeably.  
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Chapter 3 Statistical Analysis: Foreign Aid Promotes Internet Freedom 
 
 
The chapter of statistical analysis discusses aspects of hypotheses’ tests. More specifically, it 
presents operationalization of theoretical concepts (i.e. information on dependent, independent 
variables and control variables), data sources and statistical model used to estimate the 
abovementioned effect of natural resources rents and foreign aid on a leader’s decision over the 
internet regulation. The primary sources of measures are the ‘Freedom on the net score’ derived 
from the Freedom House as a proxy for ‘Internet restriction’ variable (i.e. dependent variable) 
and data that are collected by the World Bank used as a proxy for independent and control 
variables. In this section I show that correlation between aid support and internet freedom holds 
across countries and over time, however in the wrong direction and not in a cross-section setting. 
Summary statistics are presented in Appendix.  
 
3.1 Sample and Unit of Analysis 
 
The derived hypotheses focus on what factors might lead states to impose either more restrictive 
or more liberal Internet regulation. Namely, how governmental revenues (i.e. taxation or 
resources revenues/foreign aid)8 might drive a country to afford internet policy package that is 
the most suitable for the regime elite. Thus, this paper uses a country-year as a unit of analysis. 
Offering a dataset on Internet regulation both an over-time analysis (i.e. panel data analysis) and 
a study at a single point of time (i.e. cross-sectional) were conducted. Due to the problem of data 
scarcity, the temporal domain of this paper spans only from 2011 to 2016. The sample size 
                                                     
8 By taxation I mean labor-resource and by resources revenues and foreign aid - non-labor. 
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includes 65 states (36 are non-democracies), therefore it has 339 observations for the period 
2011-2016. 
 
3.2 Operationalization of Variables 
 
In this section, I take a closer look at providing operational definitions of the dependent and 
independent variables. The paper employs two data sources: the Freedom House and the World 
Bank. The theory used in this paper is an extension of the selectorate model presented above. 
The use of it, then, in terms of explaining internet regulation in nondemocracies determines a 
focus on its economic implications, namely how economic policies or ways of getting 
governmental revenues impact prospects of a political leader to maximize his chances of 
remaining in office. Within the political context, the winning coalition’s support is crucial for a 
leader to hold a power. Its size is taken into account by a leader while making any allocation 
decisions to ward off any threats that might lead to a leader’s defeat (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 
2005). Thus, for a dictator it is essential to appease his winning coalition, which is predominantly 
small.  
 
As detailed in theoretical section, it could be that non-democratic leaders who rely on resources 
rents or foreign aid can provide more restrictive internet regulation. On the other hand, the 
absence of such resources puts a political leader in a situation to collect revenues from his 
citizens through taxation. The latter scenario would allow for a less censored and open online 
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environment. Consequently, the hypotheses in terms of rent-seeking behavior (i.e. labor or labor-
free resources)9 are tested with the following research design.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
The primary dependent variable (i.e. ‘Internet restriction’) indicates whether a country has either 
open or closed Internet regime. It is proxied by the Freedom on the net score, which ranges from 
0 to 100 and available from the non-governmental organization Freedom House (FH). To 
facilitate interpretation, the higher the Freedom on the Net score, the less free is the internet 
regulation policy. Each country is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0-30 means ‘free’, 
31-60 – ‘partly free’ and a range between 61 and 100 as ‘not free’. Notice that the internet 
restriction score is available only from 2011.   
 
The numerical score of dependent variable, or ‘Internet restriction’, is a result of in- and out-
country experts’ and advisors’ evaluation of online environment. A list of in-country experts can 
be found in Freedom on the net reports. Based on a set of 21 questions and about 100 sub-
questions, the methodology is divided into three categories: obstacles to access with total 25 
points (1), limits on content with total 35 points (2) and violations of user rights with total 40 
points (3). Each question is allotted the points: the lower the number, the freer is a situation and 
vice-versa for the opposite scenario. Apart from investigating legal regulations, the questionnaire 
also captures analysis of consequences of citizens’ online activity such as free speech and other. 
 
                                                     
9 In this paper labor resources and tax resources (i.e. tax revenues) as well as non-labor resources and tax-free 
resources (i.e. natural resources’ revenues) are interchangeable notions. 
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Next, after local experts and advisors submit the draft scores, numerous regional review 
meetings, as well as international conferences, take place before the Freedom House experts 
provide a reliable final score. Since 2011 the number of evaluated countries rose from 37 to 65 in 
2016, however still not covering many autocratic states worldwide. However, according to the 
Freedom On the Net (2016) report, those 65 countries are representative with regards to 
geography, economic development, political and media freedom. Thus, as there is no other 
alternative data to measure the given dependent variable, this paper relies on the Freedom on the 
net score.  
 
Last, but not least, shortcomings of the given data used as a proxy for the outcome variable can 
significantly distort findings of the statistical analysis. Perhaps the Freedom on the Net proxy 
used by scholars is not the best way to operationalize the internet restriction/freedom variable. 
First, the exploited methodology suffers from the bias exemplified in research planning, data 
collection, its analysis etc. Secondly, the Freedom House data do not cover all authoritarian 
countries that, in turn, does not allow me as a researcher to validate the outcomes and extrapolate 
them on the group of non-democracies. Even though the score might suffer from subjective 
validation and/or sources limitation problems, the data of the Freedom House is commonly used 
by scholars and Freedom on the net score is no exception.  
 
Independent and control variables  
 
The main independent variables of the paper are ‘Resources’ and ‘Aid’. Such non-tax revenue as 
resources rents (‘Resources’) is used to test the derived hypothesis presented in a theory part. 
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‘Resources’ variable is proxied by the World Bank data – Total natural resources rents as a 
percentage of GDP. As a matter of fact, oil is the most important type of traded resource. 
However, by using the World Bank proxy the paper captures rents’ sum of oil, natural gas, coal 
(hard and soft), minerals, and forest (Total natural resources rents (% of GDP). Certainly, 
countries differ in terms of economically relevant resources they have in stock – be it oil, natural 
gas or coal. Therefore, the existence of the variable, which comprises not only oil revenues, 
allows taking into analysis those countries that might heavily rely on other mineral rents such as 
diamonds. Taking the natural logarithm can help to eliminate any possible skew to diminish an 
influence on regression of one or a few cases. Hence, I take the natural logarithm of the 
‘Resources’ variable. 
 
The ‘buy off’ argument used in the theoretical part of the paper takes foreign aid equivalent to 
natural resources rents. Thus, the following independent variable ‘Aid’, which is constructed by 
the World Bank, is utilized to measure foreign aid allocations and estimated by dividing net 
official development assistance (ODA) received and midyear population. Here, ODA or simply 
foreign aid is provided by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries. The ODA is 
designed to provide aid to developing countries with an aim to promote economic development 
(Net ODA received (% of GNI) n.d.). Worth to mention that this indicator includes a grant 
element of at least 25% and excludes aid provided for military purposes and anti-terrorism 
actions. As for ‘Resources’, I take the natural logarithm for the ‘Aid’ variable too. 
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It is important to note that overfitting a statistical model by estimating too many variables with a 
small sample size can be a problem. As a result, regression coefficients, R-squared, and p-values 
might be misleading. By specifically testing other variables that are related to the dependent 
variable (i.e. ‘Internet restriction’) the paper seeks to avoid any spurious correlations (if any). To 
provide alternative explanations the paper considers only a limited number of control variables 
such as country’s regime type (‘Polity’), gross domestic product (GDP), population size and a 
sum of estimates of the two main independent variables. Plus, new measurement of the ‘Aid’ 
variable is considered for the alternative analysis. I take the natural logarithm of all of them 
(lnGDP, ln_population, ln_free, lnODA_gov). 
 
As internet turned into a part of people’s daily life, in 2011 internet access has become a basic 
human right that was anchored by the non-binding UN resolution (Jackson 2011). Since 
democracies are less likely to put restrictions on freedoms in general, the paper controls for 
regime level. Most variants of scholarly papers draw on the Polity IV dataset, ranging from -10 
to 10 (‘autocracies’ -10 to -6, ‘anocracies’ -5 to +5, three special values: -66, -77 and -88, and 
‘democracies’ +6 to +10), as a reliable source to measure a country’s regime spectrum (The 
Polity Project). From this dataset the variable Polity2 was taken for the statistical analysis, which 
takes values only from -10 to 10 is a modified version of the Polity variable. 
 
Citizens per se advocate freedoms, which also include internet freedom. A successful economic 
performance can be essential to regimes with a large winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, et 
al. 2005). Economic structure and success indeed is crucial for political performance and a 
common control for a country’s wealth that is used to isolate any effects of economic growth to 
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the value of the outcome variable (Wantchekon 2002). The paper includes ‘GDP’ variable taken 
from the World Bank (i.e. GDP (current US$)) as a proxy. While I am interested in 
governmental revenues at a particular leader’s disposal, I take a GDP indicator that represents 
the sum of value added by all resident producers in the economy including product taxes and 
excluding any subsidies. 
 
Demographic factors such as population size, or size of the selectorate, might also impact the 
internet policy in a country. The importance of the internet as a coordination tool is crucial.  It 
follows that the larger the population size, the more complicated it might be to engage into an 
inter-communication process with a purpose to revolt (Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009). Here, 
such online instruments as social media platforms are essential when a mob/opposition plans to  
overthrow a political leader. The data on population size is derived from the World Bank data 
(Population, total).  
 
3.3 Statistical Model 
 
The statistical model choice is contingent on the type of the dependent variable and the relevant 
dataset available. As the dependent variable is continuous, the linear regression model is the 
most appropriate way to test the derived hypotheses. Intrinsically, the proposed model states that 
value on Y (or internet restriction) is predicted from knowledge of a combination of Xs (or 
independent variables) plus a random error. In terms of hypotheses, it is assumed a positive 
relationship between the level of natural resources/foreign aid and the internet restriction 
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(𝛽𝛽1,2 > 0). It is also expected that the relationship between democracy level to be negative 
(𝛽𝛽3 < 0). 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  
where 𝛽𝛽4𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡- control variables  
 
3.4 Findings  
 
This section provides empirical results derived from the testing part of hypotheses. The results 
are not consistent with the theoretical predictions, however with some exceptions. Once 
parameters are estimated, one can predict a score for the dependent variable. The results from 
analysis of labor-free resources’ impact on internet freedom are summarized in Table 1 and 
Table 2 provides similar information, but only for non-democratic countries. 
 
Table 1 Analysis of Internet Restriction (Including Democracies) 
Variables 1 2 3 
 
Resources 
 
0.557  
(0.409)  
 
 
 
 
-2.371 
(1.818)  
 
Aid  -1.616* 
(0.740)  
 
-1.497 
(0.829)  
 
Polity 
 
-2.364*** 
(0.129) 
 
-2.004*** 
(0.243) 
 
-2.203*** 
(0.274)   
 
Constant 50.832*** 
(0.984) 
 
50.486*** 
(1.710)  
 
55.393*** 
(3.462)   
 
R-squared 0.6545 0.5045 0.5326 
N 236 72 68 
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Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001” 
 
While the first two columns of Table 1 and Table 2 report coefficient estimates for one of the 
independent variables (i.e. resources and aid respectively), column 3 and 6 include all variables. 
First and foremost, the effect of democracy with its system of checks and balances and active 
participation of citizens in political life might reflect the importance of the internet as an 
additional tool of politicians and constituencies. All politicians have an incentive to stay in 
office, but in democratic countries with a large coalition it is done by promoting and distributing 
welfare, including internet freedom, to a large number of people. Barely one can argue that in 
such states bailouts are an evil. Poor political, social, economic performance is likely to be 
perceived by voters as a failure. So the demand for a positive outcome during a vote day enables 
politicians to satisfy constituencies. In turn, such a policy makes democracies stable and political 
survival secure. In both Table 1 and Table 2 the polity coefficient is positive and significant, as 
predicted by the statistical model. Thus, the more a country is democratically developed, the 
fewer internet restrictions one might observe.  
Table 2 Analysis of Internet Restriction (Non-Democratic Countries Only) 
Variables 4 5 6 
 
Resources 
0.094 
(0.679) 
 -0.700 
(2.119) 
 
Aid  -3.251**  
(0.927)   
-3.170**  
(1.151)  
 
Polity 
 
-2.127*** 
(0.240) 
 
-2.270*** 
(0.445) 
 
-2.261*** 
(0.474)  
 
Constant 52.186*** 
(1.662)  
 
47.915*** 
(2.326) 
 
49.781*** 
(4.480)   
 
R-squared 0.4335 0.5607 0.5385 
N 111 41 37 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001” 
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Notice that the coefficients of ‘Resources’ variable in columns 1 and 4 are positive and in 
columns 3 and 6 are negative, however in both cases not statistically significant. For the latter 
cases it might mean that the higher resources revenues are associated with the lower internet 
restriction. Even though the coefficient is statistically insignificant, a potential explanation for its 
negative correlation is that at present within the context of economic crisis resource-rich 
countries are trying to dispose of resource-curse, focus on economic diversification and other 
growth-oriented strategies. Hence, whenever an incumbent gets sight of an economic crisis 
appearing on the horizon by providing more internet access and freedom he potentially tries to 
benefit from the latter economically. One of the explanations is that such leaders can be 
convinced that impending political crisis can be solved by policy concessions (i.e. to impose 
more liberalized internet regulation) in terms of debt forgiveness, aid or new loans. 
 
Next, in Table 2 the coefficients in both columns for foreign aid are statistically significant in the 
wrong direction, or negatively correlated with the internet restriction score.10 It suggests that the 
more official development assistance is received by a recipient country, the stronger the positive 
effect of foreign aid on internet freedom, which is not consistent with the proposed hypothesis 
(i.e. A non-democratic country has more restrictive internet regulation as foreign aid allocations 
are high). Presumably with 1% increase of foreign aid in a share of GNI the observed value of 
the internet restriction decreases by approximately 3.2-3.3 points. Such a result is an interesting 
point for further studies.  
                                                     
10 The results hold the same outcome for the probit regression analysis. 
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As governments seek to ensure political survival and find support from the politically relevant 
groups they need to distribute benefits to the latter. The resources can be found in aid allocations, 
the amount of which can be contingent on government policies and/or their changes. By 
changing the internet regulation policy, for instance, the situation might have either positive or 
negative effect on aid disbursements provided by donors. Foreign aid itself has its own political 
logic. In principle, one explanation for such a negative correlation between aid and internet 
restriction can be hidden in the concept of conditionality, or in exchange for policies. Aid giving 
strategies have been reassessed for the last years. Leaders need resources and aid resource 
promotes their political survival. Some scholars argue that regime type is a determinant factor of 
aid’s impact on reforms: the higher the democracy level, the more effective works aid 
conditionality strategy (Montinola 2010). Furthermore, Kono and Montinola (2009) argue that 
aid helps autocrats only in the long run and donors in order to allocate disbursements more 
effectively can influence non-democratic recipient countries by offering future commitments. By 
receiving assistance autocratic leaders can reward their backers. However, a question at what 
price can a non-democracy with various coalition size be bought still remains.  
 
3.5 Alternative Explanations 
 
To account for alternative explanations, additional variables were added in the model. This 
section expands on population (1), GDP per capita (2), foreign aid as a percentage of 
governmental expenses as a split-halves method case (3) and a total amount of resources rents 
and received aid (4). As Table 3 depicts, in all cases only Polity variable is consistent with 
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previous results. Of interest is that here the coefficient of natural resources’ rents and foreign aid 
(‘Free’) in column 15 is negative and statistically significant that again contradicts to the derived 
hypothesis (i.e. A non-democratic country has more restrictive internet regulation as the 
resources’ abundance rents are high). Column 14 indicates that the higher a population of a 
country, the higher are internet restrictions, which is reasonable. Note that other variations of 
adding control variables were analyzed and no coefficient was statistically significant. 
 
Table 3 Statistical Analysis with Control Variables (Non-Democracies Only) 
 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 
 
Resources 
 
2.091                 
(6.419)  
 
 
-0.991                    
(2.305)  
 
 
-0.698    
(2.088)  
  
 
-1.943              
(2.107)  
 
 
12.486  
(7.184) 
  
Aid -2.722                    
(1.516)  
 
12.714                    
(13.010)  
 
-1.384    
(1.704)  
  
-2.387*                 
(1.160)  
 
2.027    
(8.378)  
  
Free -3.258                     
(7.060)   
 
   -22.101*  
(8.322) 
  
Aid (% of 
governmental 
expenses) 
 -14.659               
(11.667) 
 3.991 
(9.086) 
 
GDP   
 
 
3.717               
(2.647) 
 
 
 
0.852    
(5.292)  
 
Population 
 
 
 
  4.937*             
(2.381)   
2.878  
(4.353) 
  
Polity 
 
-2.273***                  
(0.480)   
 
-1.202              
(0.767)  
 
-2.309*** 
(0.468)  
  
  -2.205***              
(0.452)  
 
-2.037*** 
(0.467)  
  
Constant 52.047***                  
(6.685)  
 
70.042***            
(13.576)   
 
-42.466    
(65.847)   
  
-29.883                   
(38.665)   
 
-2.772    
(82.698)  
  
R-squared      0.5416 0.3741 0.5653 0.5931 0.5163 
N 37 21 37 37 40 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001” 
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The impact of labor free revenues (i.e. resources rents and foreign aid) among autocracies is 
showed graphically in Figures 5 and 6. Due to the fact that the Freedom on the Net includes only 
65 countries, which are either democracies or anocracies, there are only 11 autocratic countries 
(i.e. not nondemocracies), namely the states that have a score of Polity IV dataset equal or less 
than -6. In the following graphs, the author makes an attempt to depict countries by estimating 
the impact of the value of non-labor resources on the internet freedom (both variables are 
averaged). 
Figure 3 Foreign Aid and Internet Restriction (Both Averaged 2011-2016) 
 
 
Source: Freedom House and World Bank data 
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From the Figure 5 above it can be seen that there is little evidence that abundant amount of 
foreign aid is associated with the less internet freedom in a given state. Points on the left are 
stacked one atop the other. Only two countries with autocratic regime type, Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan, have the averaged score lower than 61, meaning that these states are assumed to be 
partially free in the internet domain.  Four countries were dropped by the reason that Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, China and the United Arab Emirates according to the Net ODA data have not 
received any official external aid support. In other countries, it appears that the more depraved 
outcome value may be affected by other reasons than just aid support.  
 
Figure 4 Natural Resources Rents and Internet Restriction (Both Averaged 2011-2016) 
 
Source: Freedom House and World Bank data 
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Moreover, natural resources imply some weak evidence to suggest that the more revenues an 
autocratic government receives from its resources (i.e. oil, gas etc.), the less free is the internet. 
Among the top countries, which receive more revenues from natural resources are China, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia. According to Figure 6, one can see that the distance between one billion and 
almost six hundred billion is about plus 20 points of Freedom on the net score. However, barely 
one can make any valid conclusions as information of a small subset of non-democratic countries 
were used in the analysis.  
 
Above I asked, whether the statistical analysis can provide information about the effect of labor 
free revenues on the internet freedom score. In general, from the graphs above one can conclude 
that there is no discernable effect of labor-free revenues on online censorship policy, as the 
models suffer from the small sample size bias. However, the statistical results suggest that 
contrary to the derived hypotheses non-democratic countries has less restrictive internet 
regulation as foreign aid allocations are high. In sum, it would be interesting to conduct analysis 
in about five years and see, if there is any statistically significant relationship. Hence, the frontier 
question still remains. 
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Chapter 4 Case Studies: Internet as a Tool to Strengthen Control 
 
Taking into account the limitation of the preliminary statistical estimation, namely the absence of 
large-N data that can provide a general measurement of the internet freedom for all non-
democratic countries in numerous years, the paper seeks to apply case study analysis in order to 
derive valid conclusions.   
 
The internet freedom is proxied by the Freedom on the net score, which ranges from 0 to 100 
(i.e. the higher the score, the worse is a situation with internet freedom). First, to choose 
countries for the case study based on the internet freedom score change, 10 cases were selected: 
Thailand, Ukraine, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Russia, and Turkey are in the ‘score decline’ 
group, whereas Georgia, Tunisia, and Brazil are among ‘score improvement’ group. Moreover, 
according to the final report of the Freedom House the following five countries experienced the 
steepest deterioration of the internet freedom for the last five years (Freedom On the Net 2016 
n.d.): Ukraine, Venezuela, Turkey, Russia, Ethiopia. To combine twelve countries can 
potentially be investigated in this chapter.  
 
To test the theory, countries with a large within-case variance of dependent variable were chosen 
(i.e. Venezuela, Ethiopia, and Turkey). Whereas Venezuela and Ethiopia present within case 
variance of an independent variable, the case of Turkey is atypical in this respect, but still 
remains in the ‘score decline’ group. As it experienced almost no variance (or better to say 
variance in unusually small quantities), Turkey might leave alternative explanations for the given 
research puzzle.  
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The fact that all three countries belong to the category of non-democracies gives an opportunity 
to thoroughly investigate the examined phenomenon of internet regulation. For example, 
Venezuela as a country with abundant natural resources and revenues received from oil reserves 
represents the category of rentier states. Ethiopia, in turn, is an example of a state that receives a 
relatively large amount of aid from foreign donors. Doing so, namely taking for analysis 
Venezuela and Ethiopia with prominent variation in natural resources revenues as well as foreign 
aid allocations, may provide profound insights into explaining why do some countries have more 
restricted internet control and others do not. Finally, Turkey’s example introduces a state with no 
significant amount of either resources’ rent or development assistance available for 
governmental funds – be it public or private goods expenditure. The instance of Turkey is used 
as a control case to see, whether the results of previous cases (i.e. Venezuela and Ethiopia) 
support the derived hypotheses or not.  
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4.1 Venezuela: Resource Curse as a Premise? 
 
The country that emerged after the collapse of Gran Colombia, which is extremely 
overdependent on natural resources revenues, for the last five years experienced one of the 
steepest internet freedom deterioration alongside with Ukraine, Turkey, Russia and Ethiopia 
(Freedom On the Net 2016 n.d.). According to Polity IV dataset, in 2000s Venezuela from being 
a democracy turned into the category of closed anocracy (Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-
2015). As much of the government’s revenue comprise oil rents, oil price drop in 2014 worsened 
the economic situation of Venezuela with ended 275% of inflation in 2015. As a response, the 
government under Nicolas Maduro aimed at increased control over the national economy (The 
world factbook: Venezuela n.d.).  
 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has a long history with oil. As it can be seen, Venezuela 
is a heavily oil-dependent country. Auty (2005) asserts that high oil rents in the case of 
Venezuela erode “checks and balances as part of a negative socio-economic spiral”. Venezuela 
eschewed a policy that aimed at import substitution, building a system of rent extraction from oil 
export mostly. Failure to ration rents in the last years prompted authoritarianism and low public 
goods distribution. Following this idea Hammond (2011) underlines that a country with abundant 
reserves of natural resources is prone to economic afflictions as in the long run industrial 
diversity is undermined. After Hugo Chavez came to power in 1998 a number of laws were 
passed that was aimed at taking governmental control over the Venezuelan state-owned oil and 
natural gas company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). Even though the Venezuelan 
government invested revenues of PVDSA in public spending, oil overdependence accompanied 
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with a decline in oil prices have put the country on the brink of economic collapse (Timmerman 
2012).  
 
After the 47-hour coup d'état attempt of 2002, which was a response to Chavez’s reforms in the 
oil industry, Chavez suffered from the popularity decline. However, after his supporters 
demanded his return a series of social programs were initiated called “Las Misiones”. The 
formula of the social programs covered a wide range of problems among the poor population: 28 
missions served interests of those who had no access to medicine, housing, job training etc. 
(Pedro España N. 2008). Many of such public spending projects were extremely costly, 
unsustainable in investments and ineffectively managed like the social programs “Las Misiones”.   
Undeniable fact that such bold socio-political promises, namely social programs, brought 
political fruits. Nevertheless, still efficient management of oil revenues was a challenging task 
for the Venezuelan government. 
Figure 5 Internet Restriction Score in Venezuela between 2011 and 201611 
 
Source: Freedom House data 
                                                     
11 Note that the higher the score, the lower is internet freedom. 
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Hugo Chavez was an active supporter of a higher internet penetration in Venezuela. Even though 
the number of internet users rose beyond 60% among the national population, it is worth 
mentioning that the internet penetration is exceptionally uneven that is strongly pronounced in 
the urban and rural divide. According to Freedom House country report, up to the moment the 
average broadband speed in Venezuela is the lowest among other Latin American states. In turn, 
that fact can be buttressed by the number of broadband subscriptions, which changed 
insignificantly for the last fifteen years. Mostly that happened due to economic turmoil when a 
number of factors badly influenced telecommunication sector’s development. (Freedom on the 
Net 2016 Venezuela 2016). 
Table 4 Internet Usage in Venezuela 
 
 2000 2015 
Internet user (per 100 people) 37.37 61.869 
Mobile cellular subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 
22.318 92.972 
Fixed broadband subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 
0.018 8.245 
 
Source: World Bank data  
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Figure 6 Fuel Exports of Venezuela (% of Merchandise Exports)12 
 
Source: World Bank data  
 
As the theory states, if a non-democratic country relies on natural resources revenues (in the case 
of Venezuela it is oil revenues), it has more restrictive internet regulation to ensure political 
survival of a ruling elite. By analyzing the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela the 
primary as well as secondary factors that led to internet freedom score decline to be examined. 
 
In order to estimate natural resources revenues, the World Bank ‘Total natural resources rents’ 
indicator was chosen which is proxied by the percentage amount of GDP. It comprises oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. However, for some 
unknown reason, it lacks the numbers for 2014-2016. 
 
According to Figure 4.1.4 it can be seen that resources revenues dropped by roughly a half since 
2005 putting the country in record-setting shortages and economic crisis. Meanwhile, internet 
                                                     
12 The data is available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN?end=2013&locations=VE&start=1990  
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restriction level reached the score of an internet ‘not free’ country in 2016. It seems that the 
Bolivarian government tried to exploit external revenues to ward off from threats and 
simultaneously undertake steps to authoritarian adaptation. Nevertheless, one cannot make any 
causal relationship.  
 
Figure 7 Internet Restriction Score and Natural Resources Revenue in Venezuela 
 
Source: Freedom House and World Bank data 
 
Article 57 of the Constitution states that “everyone has the right to express freely his or her 
thoughts … and no censorship shall be established. Anonymity, war propaganda, discriminatory 
messages or those promoting religious intolerance are not permitted” (Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (in English). Chronologically speaking, in 2000 as it was 
noted by the Presidential Decree №825 of Hugo Chavez, the internet access was promoted as the 
country’s integral part of development policy agenda that to some extent helped him to gain 
electoral support and approval (see Figure 4.1.3).  
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However, in 2002 the short coup against the President took place. Many radios and television 
stations were closed due to alleged ties in anti-governmental rallies and oppositional lines 
(Dizard 2010). Even if the government of Hugo Chavez in 2000s restricted freedom of press on 
the radio, printed media and television by adopting the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio 
and Television (Ley Resorte) of 2004 and the new Criminal Code Reform Law of 2005, the 
internet domain, especially personal internet use, was not restricted. Thus, according to the U.S. 
Department report regarding a situation with human rights in Venezuela, “there were no 
government restrictions on the internet or academic freedom” (OpenNet Initiative Country 
Profile. Venezuela 2007). An illustrative example, the next step for the ruling elite was to 
provide a necessary infrastructure. The launch of the satellite Simon Bolivar in 2008 from the 
Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province. According to the Ministry of Science and 
Technology of Venezuela, the total amount of money spent on the project was 241 million 
dollars (China launch VENESAT-1 – debut bird for Venezuela 2008). Along with other 
governmental programs like “Las Misiones”, seems like the government of Hugo Chaves funded 
by high oil revenues set a goal to increase public goods, including online domain to gain support 
from the constituencies. At that time there was no sound evidence that indicated any internet 
restrictions – be it access limitations and/or users’ rights violations. The ‘success’ of Venezuela 
on the international arena was dictated mostly by the fact that the number of internet users were 
negligible and barely could pose a threat by means of a social media mobilized revolutionary 
mob. Thus, mass media typified by a numerical indicator did not include internet, but the former 
was heavily restricted.  
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Figure 8 Views of Chavez's Leadership 13 
 
Source: Gallup data 
 
Nevertheless, the positive line was replaced by consequent governmental initiatives that affected 
a number of internet use domains. For example, in 2007 President Chavez announced the plan of 
former privately owned internet service provider (ISP) the National Telephone Company of 
Venezuela CANTV to be nationalized. Since its privatization, this ISP was in possession of 
about 80% of the national internet market (OpenNet Initiative Country Profile. Venezuela 2007). 
According to the National Plan for Telecommunications, Information Technology and Postal 
Services 2007-2013, the government "recognizes communication as a human right and 
telecommunications and information technology as tools for securing that right". Nevertheless, 
since 2009 a number of adopted decrees and other governmental decisions contradicted the 
before mentioned ideas of the wide internet access were on the increase. In 2010 the parliament 
                                                     
13 The data is available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/161756/special-briefing-chavez-legacy-venezuela-
future.aspx  
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passed a law with a statement to monitor internet content in line with the Ley Resorte (Marguelas 
2016). On the one hand, the head of state encouraged citizens to be online, on the other, in 2010s 
online emerging governmental criticism was condemned and called as a form of “media 
terrorism”. 
 
Doubtless, such governmental decisions were a cause for concern about the future of the 
Venezuelan internet. Moreover, in 2010 the network access point for Web service provision was 
entirely managed by newly nationalized ISP – CANTV. Many critics asserted a claim that the 
government could totally usurp the power of the internet for the sake of the ruling elite. And they 
were right because in 2012 the first website blockings took place, namely, netizens using 
CANTV struggled with access problems to website “La Patilla”, WordPress, Blogger. The 
former website’s blockage was presumably because of video streaming of clashes in La Planta 
prison that barely were covered by national media (Venezuela 2012).  
 
After the death of President Chavez in 2013 many people went out on the streets, they were 
detained for posts and uploading provocative photos online dedicated to political issues 
(OpenNet Initiative Country Profile. Venezuela 2013). During the Presidential elections the 
political sensitivity in Venezuela was extremely high: occasionally for several minutes CANTV 
shut down the broadband service, oppositional websites were temporary blocked. The site of the 
National Electoral Council also was displuged leaving voters unable to track results. As Ministry 
of Science and Technology explained such measures were undertaken to stop hacking attacks 
from outside and to identify responsible ones (Freedom on the Net. Venezuela 2013). 
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In 2013 it was also announced that intelligence services would not disregard instigators who look 
for country destabilization by means of social media. The government of Nicolas Maduro 
arrested many netizens who expressed their dislikes or criticism via Twitter and other platforms. 
For example, Lourdes Alicia Ortega Perez was arrested “for spreading false information” via 
Twitter, where to reply on how Hugo Chavez passed away, she wrote, “I don’t know, but he’s a 
wax doll now.” She was released a week later (NGOs Denounce Venezuela’s Human-Rights 
Abuses before UN Committee 2015).  
Figure 9 Total Removal Requests Google Received from Venezuela by the Year since 2009 
 
Source: Google Transparency Report data 
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Figure 10 Reasons for Removal Requests from the Government Agencies and Law 
Enforcement in Venezuela 
 
Source: Google Transparency Report data 
Worth mentioning that the growth of online restrictions embodied in the legal sense was 
coincided with the rise of Arab Spring in the Middle Eastern countries, starting from Tunisia. 
One trend comes clear that the announced by the government widespread use and access to the 
internet bumped up against the control of the latter. Situation assumed to be risky in Venezuela 
looking at the intensive campaigns that rapidly occurred in the Arab world and led to series of 
Presidents’ ousting, sometimes murderous ones. Hence, the Venezuelan government decided to 
respond by actions controlling the internet domain despite the fact that in 2011-2013 the oil price 
was at a mark of 110 dollars per barrel (Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products n.d.). 
For now, Venezuela is also famous for its practices of the so-called ‘cadena’, an obligatory 
broadcast of governmental messages to impose a one-sided version of current events, to 
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demonize political opponents and to make a solid propaganda(The Venezuelan Government 
Uses This Trick to Control Media Coverage 2014). However, the internet and social media, in 
particular, are not dependent on cadenas.  
 
The last couple of years social media in Venezuela is seen as a platform for liberation as well as 
a marketplace. Local residents taking into account the economic crisis that harshly hit the 
country use those platforms as a broadcasting tool to share useful information about goods 
exchanges or medication purchases, for example. There are online groups called ‘treque’, which 
using available resources provide benefits to the Venezuelan society (Marguelas 2016).  
 
The Venezuelan ruling elite accepts the fact that the internet is a vital tool in terms of social 
reach. President Maduro appears to be pro-internet active being one of the most retweeted 
leaders, however one of the negatively appraised at the same time (Twiplomacy Study 2016 
2016). In the era of Nicolas Maduro, there are numerous facts of web content blocking and 
filtering of information on the political ground (Freedom on the Net 2016 Venezuela 2016). 
Nevertheless, the Venezuelan government under conditions of high inflation, lack of basic 
staples is not likely to afford the mass online blackout or its control, as it requires human and 
technical resources it barely can do so. By this reason the ruling elite and its command venture to 
detain active Twitter users, online activists seeking to prevent social unrest, anxiety and any 
forms of political destabilization.  
 
To conclude, according to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), leaders of a small winning 
coalition that is the case of Venezuela with access to the so-called labor-free resources (i.e. oil 
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and foreign aid) are more likely to suppress public goods in order to decrease the probability of 
revolts’ success. In a phenomenon called a resource curse, nations are ready to extract resources 
and systematically underperform public goods. In the case of Venezuela among the public goods 
that include the presence of freedom of speech, the internet freedom takes a special role. After 
examining the Venezuelan internet regulation mechanism one can find a weak relation between 
the resources’ revenues and rise in internet restriction. Natural resources are tremendous for 
autocrats, when the latter do not have to be encouraged to work and be reasonably taxed. Leaders 
of nondemocracies massively reward their essential backers with resources revenues and yet 
distance outsiders from a coalition by keeping them poor and unorganized. One of the ways to do 
so is to restrict internet freedom, namely by limiting internet access and prosecuting anti-
governmental online activists. It is still ironic how resources revenues that are received to fix 
problems (especially societal) can create more issues. Among other factors to impact the internet 
freedom in non-democracies are regime change and political instability more generally.  Indeed, 
every technique used to suppress mass media platforms, including online ones, were associated 
with an opportunity to move beyond threats to regime’s stability.  
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4.2 Ethiopia: Heavy-Handed Approach to Internet 
 
To begin with, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is one of strictest countries in terms 
of internet freedom environment. According to the Freedom on the Net report, despite the fact 
that Ethiopia’s telecommunication infrastructure is relatively poor, the government monopoly 
intensified its control over the internet and its netizens (Freedom On the Net 2016 n.d.). 
However, the ruling elite of the country sees a development of the information and 
communication technology as a tool for poverty reduction (The National Information and 
Communication Technology Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia 2009).  
 
Table 5 Internet Usage in Ethiopia 
 
 2000 2015 
Internet user (per 100 people) 0.015 11.6 
Mobile cellular subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 
0.027 42.764 
Fixed broadband subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 
0 0.658 
 
Source: World Bank data 
 
According to the World Bank data, Ethiopia is among the countries with lowest internet 
penetration, the score of which changed insignificantly for the last 15 years. Moreover, it takes 
119th and 135th places in the availability of latest technology and internet using individuals 
respectively (Schwab 2016). 
 
Ethiopia is one of the countries that ‘hijacked’ the fight against terrorism narrative and passed 
laws to restrict freedom of speech and expression. For the first time internet was introduced in 
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the late 1990s with a limited access. The rise of human rights violation in the media domain can 
be tracked from 2005 after the parliamentarian elections when they were followed by a number 
of protests and arrests. In 2006 the government denied access to online publications related to 
political topics, one of the was the blodpost.com website (Internet Filtering in Ethiopia in 2006-
2007 2007).  
 
Figure 13 The Internet Restriction Score in Ethiopia between 2011 and 201614 
 
Source: Freedom House data 
 
The poor internet proliferation was reflected in the legislative system. The first internet-related 
law was adopted in 2004. Namely, the Criminal Code included a list of online fraud like hacking 
and malware dissemination (Yilma and Abraha 2015). Exclusive control over the internet is 
taken by the governmental the Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency (ETA). In 2008 the Mass 
Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation was passed that increased the governmental 
power to convict journalists and deny press licenses on the ground of national security. In recent 
                                                     
14 Note that the higher the score, the lower is internet freedom. 
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developments under the Anti-Terrorist proclamation of 2009 convictions of bloggers and online 
journalists took place. In 2012 Eskinder Nega blogger was sentenced to 18 years after publishing 
an article the questioned the execution of the Anti-Terrorist law including mass arrests 
(Ethiopian blogger Eskinder Nega jailed for 18 years 2012). In such a manner the Ethiopian 
government outlaws any action that is considered to be dissident and gag any oppositional 
voices. In 2016 a new Computer Crime Proclamation ignited public concern. Thus according to 
article 14 says, “any written, video, audio or any other picture that incites fear, violence, chaos or 
conflict among people shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding three 
years” (Ethiopia Computer Crime Proclamation Text Draft 2016). Potentially any protest and 
campaign can be suppressed using the article 14. 
 
Ethiopia is no exception when dealing with antigovernment protests and rallies. In 2015 the 
Oromia region’s residents started a peaceful assembly mainly against an investment project that 
required destruction of forest and football field, but also due to capital’s territory expansion 
(“Master plan”) that could have a negative impact on locals. According to Human Rights Watch, 
the Ethiopian security forces lethally wounded hundreds of people, arrested and detained 
influential individuals among the local inhabitants (“Such a Brutal Crackdown” 2016). Blocking 
regime was reinforced and resulted in a shutdown of websites like Ayyantuu.net and Opride.com 
that reported about the protests and social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and 
WhatsApp. Still, in 2016 bloggers like Seyoum Teshome, who write about the Oromia protests 
can be sentenced behind the bars (Freedom on the Net country report. Ethiopia 2016). 
 
  
57 
As Gagliardone (2014) notes, Ethiopia has developed “love-hate relationship” with its donors, as 
they receive a particular amount of aid, but barely challenge their already solidified system.  This 
idea is followed by Dirbaba and O’Donnell (2012) who argue that the government of Ethiopia 
has two objectives while liberalizing their media domain: 1) to attract the attention of foreign aid 
donor-countries; 2) to hold its power by excessively silencing independent journalism, for 
example.  Moreover, the government of Ethiopia receives a substantial amount of the U.S. 
foreign aid, as the latter perceives the African country as an ally in the war against terrorism, 
especially within Southern Somalia-based “Al-Shabaab” jihadi fundamentalist group. However, 
in fall of 2016, the Ethiopia withdrew its troops from the territory of Somalia. As the Minister of 
Communications of Ethiopia informed, “keeping the troops there is posing an economic burden 
and logistical challenges to the government” (Ethiopian Troop Withdrawals in Somalia Raise 
Concern of Al-Shabab Resurgence n.d.).  
Figure 14 Internet Restriction Score and Foreign Aid in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Freedom House and World Bank data 
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According to data provided by the World Bank, ‘net official development assistance (ODA) per 
capita’ indicator consists of “disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote 
economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA 
recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 10 percent)” (Net ODA received per capita (current US$) n.d.). The Ethiopian 
government became a suspect in ‘buying out’ international aid from the USA, UK, and EU for 
the substantial amount of political reforms, however with no caring about human rights, freedom, 
and democratization (Feyissa 2011; Stremlau 2011).  
 
To sum up, does foreign aid in Ethiopia good for policy or simply good for politics, as Bueno de 
Mesquita and Alastair Smith ask (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). The case of Ethiopia 
depicts a weak connection between foreign aid and internet freedom. One cannot simply 
condemn the ineffectiveness of aid only by a reason of a recipient country’s poor performance. 
Ethiopia might be a case that clearly illustrates a fact that aid is readily given to those countries 
whose policy concessions (not necessarily in the internet freedom sphere) are in need for donors 
than other noble goals like poverty reduction, for instance. The ruling elite represented by the 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front or EPRDF government with no exception 
ensures itself a political survival by decreasing ability of the mob to protest and revolt. Hence, 
the Ethiopian government implements the more restrictive internet regulation policy in order to 
diminish the probability of being ousted. To achieve these ends, the regime elite needs to be 
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economically stable to keep members of the winning coalition loyal and be sure that people can 
not rebel and take control of the country. 
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4.3 Turkey: Instability as a Step to Regressive Approach to Online Freedom 
 
The republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and had a 
Western-oriented course since then. Fragmented by the periods of stability and military coups the 
transcontinental country of Eurasia remains one of the least free states in terms of internet 
regulation. In the latest released report of the Freedom House called Freedom on the Net, Turkey 
was named as one of five countries with the largest internet freedom score decline. With a drop 
in 16 points and only half population with internet access this country experience almost all 
forms of internet restrictions and human rights violations in this regard.  
 
Figure 15 Internet Restriction in Turkey between 2011 and 201615 
 
Source: Freedom House data 
  
                                                     
15 Note that the higher the score, the lower is internet freedom. 
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Table 6 Internet Usage in Turkey 
 
 2000 2015 
Internet user (per 100 people) 3.762 53.745 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 
100 people) 
25.538 96.021 
Fixed broadband subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 
0.017 (2001) 12.393 
 
Source: World Bank data 
 
The telecommunications sphere in Turkey has been actively developed in recent years. The 
market is characterized by a growth of the internet penetration and a growing number of 
privately-owned internet service providers (ISPs). The aim of Turkey to become a part of the 
European Union was one of the driving forces to liberalize telecommunications and IT sectors. 
In this regard, the regulatory authority was legally established in 2000 called Information and 
Communication Technologies Authority. Plus, the major ISP Turk telecom from being a state-
owned company since 2005 were partly privatized in accordance with World Trade Organization 
agreement that stated privatization by 2005 (Wolcott and Goodman 2000). However, of 
particular concern was a condition of company’s share privatization restriction to 21-year 
concession agreement and later be returned to the government (OpenNet Initiative Country 
Profile. Turkey 2010). 
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Figure 16 Internet Restriction Score, Foreign Aid and Resources Rents in Turkey 
 
Source: Freedom House and World Bank data 
 
The case of Turkey was chosen to illustrate other alternative explanations. As the country does 
not rely on either resources rents or foreign aid, it can be helpful to detect other reasons that can 
impact the internet freedom domain in non-democratic countries. According to the OSCE report 
on Freedom of the Media on Turkey and Internet Censorship, the hands-off approach with no 
specific laws in regulating the internet was replaced at the beginning of the 2000s. Namely, in 
2002 the Turkish Parliament approved the amendments to the Radio, Television and Press Code. 
It included the internet domain as a subject of press legislation (Akdeniz 2009). The following 
enacted law No.5651 in 2007 is also known as the internet Law became a legal basis for the 
numerous cases of website blockings that were aimed to fight online crimes. In details, law 
No.5651 listed a catalog of crimes that should be banned unilaterally, which include incitement 
to suicide, gambling, insult of Ataturk etc. (Akgul and Kirlidog 2015). 
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The internet Law, as well as adopted Regulations governing the mass use providers in 2007, 
implemented some self-regulated solutions in terms of online access to various harmful and 
illegal materials. When the internet access was in an increase at the beginning of the 2000s, 
many internet café owners came across with problems of state control over their business. In 
2000 Minister of Internal Affairs publicly announced that internet cafes with unhindered access 
to pornographic websites and separatism inclined information after a written warning first would 
be shut down (Yesil 2003). By those actions government aimed to ensure moral societal fabric 
close to Ataturk’s principles, however not keeping on personal use of computers at home. 
 
The legal developments of the original Law on the internet in 2014 were heavily criticized by 
activists and human rights defenders, raising serious concern about Turkey’s determination to 
enter the EU. In sum, the new bill passed the Turkish government with a majority of Erdogan’s 
AKP party members and since then the government holds an authority to block any website 
without a court decision (The Last Chance To Stop Turkey’s Harsh New internet Law 2014). 
From Ankara to Istanbul people went outside to protest the new internet regulations. Worth 
mentioning here that a year earlier the so-called Gezi Park protests took place that were 
organized and managed mainly by means of social media. Twitter had proven itself to be 
effective in mobilizing the masses. Moreover, after the law amendments, the telecommunication 
authority has a power to order a shutdown of a website to be performed by ISPs within four 
hours. As the prime minister at that day, Recep Erdogan, said, “there is no censorship on the 
internet. Freedoms are not restricted. We are only taking precautions against blackmail and 
immorality” (New internet law in Turkey sparks outrage 2014).  
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Figure 17 Total Removal Requests Google Received from Turkey by the Year since 2009 
 
Source: Google Transparency Report data 
 
 
According to the latest Google Transparency report, requests coming from Turkish authorities to 
remove particular web content rose dramatically in 2013, then dropped and rose again at the end 
of the year 2015 (Turkey – Government Removal Requests – Transparency Report – Google 
n.d.). Presumably the high number of requests during the period of late 2012 until the end 2013 
can be aligned with the Occupy Gezi protest, whereas an increase of 2015 is associated with the 
Turkish parliamentarian elections and terrorist attacks during peace rallies in Ankara (Shaheen 
and Letsch 2015; Turkey election 2015). 
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Figure 18 Reasons for Removal Requests from the Telecommunications Communication 
Presidency of the Information and Communications Technologies Authority in Turkey 
 
Source: Google Transparency Report data 
Corruption is a specific topic in Turkey the ruling elite tries to conceal. After the Gezi park 
protests in July of 2013, the month of December hit the government with a huge corruption 
scandal. Arrested and accused people were charged with bribery and fraud, among of them were 
sons of three ministers and allegedly one of the Erdogan’s sons could also be in pre-trial custody. 
As a result, the cabinet of ministers resigned and many netizens were detained, one of them was 
Sedef Kabaş (Freedom on the Net country report. Turkey 2015). It should be stressed that 
responsible for investigation attorney, Muammer Akkas, was replaced when the official 
authorities supposedly declined his further investigation and arrest of other suspects 
((www.dw.com) n.d.). The scandal of 2013 that hovered over the high-ranking officials 
provoked the partial blackout of a number of websites, detention of activists as well as 
‘cleansing’ of political opponent Fethullah Gülen’s possible cronies. 
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Elections, terrorist violence, and protests marked 2015. That year was the last one when Turkey 
was identified as a partly free country. In the first half of 2015, about 90% of received requests 
by Twitter to remove particular content emanated from Turkey (Freedom on the Net country 
report. Turkey 2015). It became a common practice to temporary block social media platforms 
such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube during acts of social unrest. For instance, in April 2015 
the Prosecutor was taken as a hostage by leftist radicals who demanded justice in investigating 
the death of a teenager, Berkin Elvan, who got injured by policemen during the Gazi park 
protests in 2013 and died later (Quinn 2015). The Criminal Court of Istanbul issued an order that 
banned access to dozens of news websites, twitter posts and accounts as well as YouTube videos 
(Freedom on the Net country report. Turkey 2015). Of particular interest is the way the 
government negotiated with Twitter and Facebook in order to surmount crises. The findings of 
Bulut (2016) reveal is that in the case of Turkey Twitter was one of the resistant social media 
platforms that don’t share any private information with the government of Turkey and approving 
one-third of requests for banning compared to Facebook’s prioritization to serve interests of 
Erdogan’s government. 
 
Downgraded last year the internet freedom in Turkey was given a score of 61 out of 100 for the 
first time categorizing the country ‘not free’. According to the Freedom on the Net report 
(Freedom on the Net Country profile. Turkey 2016), network shutdowns, social media briefly 
blackouts and lengthy sentences characterize the year of 2016 because of criticism of the 
government, officials’ email leak etc. The coup in July 2016 attempted by Turkish military made 
people struggling with internet access for a couple of hours. However, later the Web was used by 
the President to initiate a campaign fighting with anti-President coup plotters. As it was noted by 
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a reporter Jeffrey Eisenach (How the internet stopped the coup in Turkey n.d.), Erdogan’s live-
stream via Face Time to his supporters within minutes got his army together and it can be the 
first time when the internet saved the government to be overthrown. 
 
It is likely that Erdogan’s regime is supported by that part of the population who admire the 
political figure of the President. Such dedication is almost unwavering and not without reason. 
Since his election in 2003, he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) party initiated 
urbanization programs and sparked the economic boom in the country. By implementing carrots 
and sticks strategy, the AKP may either bring some public benefits in particular district or put it 
in a disadvantageous position (Who still supports Turkey’s AKP? 2014).  Bartertrade is seen to 
be in common: political loyalty translates into public goods provision. Still having public 
support, the ruling elite implements policies that favor the regime’s survival, in particular, more 
restrictive internet regulation, however still satisfying the majority of core electorate by 
providing basic needs such as medicine, jobs and other goods. Under such conditions, political 
leaders are more ready to limit provision of public goods and/or distribute them pointwise, in 
particular, such a valuable public good as freedom – be it freedom of speech (online/offline), 
freedom of assembly and any other.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
The internet is a crucial platform through which people can advocate for political, economic, 
social reforms. Fearing all given possibilities by wider internet openness, authoritarian leaders 
find various ways to manipulate it. The purpose of this paper was to identify factors that impact a 
change in internet regulation among non-democracies. Extrapolating the selectorate model and 
concept of audience costs I explore this puzzle by evaluating the impact of non-tax revenues, 
namely natural resources revenues and foreign aid allocations on the level of Web control and its 
openness in given countries. The theory of this paper is the extension of the selectorate model 
and it claims that leaders, who pursue a goal to prolong their stay in office, might provide less 
public goods and curtail citizens’ rights by implementing more restrictive internet regulation, in 
particular. 
 
In order to investigate how non-tax revenues affect a leader’s decision to restrict or liberalize 
internet control, I conducted the quantitative and the qualitative analysis. Analysis of the panel 
data from 2011-2016 is not consistent with the theory predictions. The statistical part revealed 
the opposite effect of the derived hypothesis: labor-free revenues (i.e. foreign aid) have a positive 
impact on internet freedom among nondemocratic countries. One interpretation of this finding is 
that foreign aid is allocated to finance public goods consumption when a supply of official 
development assistance is explained by a demand of recipient countries. Nevertheless, due to the 
scarcity of data and questionable measurement of the dependent variable, I believe that outcomes 
call for more research on how to resolve the abovementioned problems. 
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In the case study analysis of Venezuela, Ethiopia, and Turkey it was found out that political 
factors exercise a powerful impact on changing internet regulation policy. By focusing solely on 
the economic trajectory of oil reliance such countries as Venezuela invested a lot in public 
spending. However, now when the Dutch disease (or resource curse) has its effect and taking 
into account the evidence that abundant oil dependence put serious drawbacks on economic 
growth (Seghir and Damette 2013), to cultivate a loyal electorate requires variants other than 
resource revenues spending that is in scarce. Political costs of imposing a more restrictive 
internet regulation are put on the back burner, as for the majority of citizens of Venezuela it is 
more critical to have access not to the online platforms, but to basic key items. In turn, Ethiopia 
and Turkey are the illustrative cases to depict a ruling elite’s decision to lessen the probability of 
being ousted with help of internet shutdown, violation of users’ rights and persecution of online 
activists. With help of internet, that type of actions makes it difficult to political opponents to 
challenge an incumbent leader, to promote political alternatives and mobilize masses suggesting 
that internet control exercised by a government reflects an ability to maintain an iron grip status. 
 
The second part of my analysis (i.e. case study) derived the next question: what role does 
political instability play in affecting the internet freedom? From that standpoint, one can 
conclude that the logic of political survival has failed to explain the variation of Web regulation 
among non-democratic countries. The new question arises: how does socio-political instability 
affect a change in the given dependent variable?  A reasonable step would be to add a new 
independent variable ‘socio-political unrest’.  
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The thesis presents several policy implications. First, my statistical findings suggest that we will 
see a more liberalized internet in a non-democratic country that is largely supported through 
official aid canals. Given the fact that some authoritarian countries like Saudi Arabia are self-
beneficiated authoritarian countries, there is a little chance they will relax a grip on internet. 
Secondly, the truth behind the internet regulation in nondemocratic countries is that internet 
freedom operates only in interests of a ruling elite. The telecommunication infrastructure is 
produced with the goal to solidify the government’s position referring to obscure justifications to 
ensure national security and stability. As it was found out it is better to say that the question here 
is not only about internet policy in general, instead one should focus on an incumbent’s reactions 
to particular socio-political challenges in terms of internet restriction. Examples like Turkey 
clearly illustrates that if an unrest in social or political space takes places a menu of actions 
available to protesters narrows significantly (i.e. shutdowns, persecution etc.). Therefore, for 
citizens of authoritarian regimes internet itself is perceived as a boon for changes – be it political, 
economic or social. Precisely because the internet is seen as a threat to political survival and 
during the high level of violence apart from restrictive regulatory mechanisms dictators widely 
appreciate the ability of the Web to protect their hold on power. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
Descriptive Statistics (both democracies and non-democracies) 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std.Deviation Min. Max. 
Internet restriction 339 46.0413 21.00306 6 91 
Resources 796 8.064316 11.50911 0 60.83433 
Aid 227 5.317458 9.085256 0 53.5706 
Free 205 14.52843 13.77095 .1305958 93.96413 
Polity 826 4.099274 6.150226 -10 10 
GDP  405 6.66e+11    2.21e+12 2.33e+08   1.80e+13 
Population 426 5.97e+07 2.02e+08 36537 1.37e+09 
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Appendix B 
Cross-Sectional Analysis for 2014 (both democracies and nondemocracies) 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Resources 
 
0.697                
(0.688)    
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
-0.942    
(3.358)  
 
1.076 
(8.775)  
 
Aid   -1.782           
(1.445) 
 
 
-1.160                    
(1.803)  
-0.749 
(2.486)  
 
Free 
  -3.067          
(3.736)  
   -2.617 
(10.448)  
 
Polity - 2.375***                
(0.247)   
-2.112***              
(0.460)  
-2.509***              
(0.479)  
-2.233*** 
(0.519)  
-2.264** 
(0.551)   
Constant 50.028***            
(1.808) 
49.562***              
(3.092)  
59.355***                  
(7.397)  
52.721*** 
(6.010)    
44.448** 
(8.919)  
R-squared      0.6902 0.5582 0.6368 0.5918 0.5938 
N 54 20 19 18 18 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001” 
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Appendix C 
Cross-Sectional Analysis for 2014 (non-democracies only) 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Resources 
 
0.723 
(1.011) 
 
 
  
 
  
 
-1.585    
(2.746)  
 
-5.559    
(7.620) 
Aid   -4.104* 
(1.489) 
 
 
-4.785                
(2.294)   
-5.855                     
(3.087) 
 
Free 
  -2.205                
(3.770)  
 4.992    
(8.843)  
Polity 
 
-2.189*** 
(0.438)  
-2.532**  
(0.547)  
-3.221**  
(0.732)  
-2.544** 
(0.634)  
-2.444*                  
(0.697)  
Constant 50.206*** 
(2.612)   
46.435*** 
(2.819)  
53.768***              
(7.847) 
48.515*** 
(4.950)  
44.448** 
(8.919)  
R-squared      0.5393 0.8056 0.7097 0.8233 0.8339 
N 27 12 11 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10   ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001” 
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